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Milliken v. Bradley: The Meaning of the
Constitution in School Desegregation Cases
By NORmAN C. AmAKER*
I. Overview
With Milliken v. Bradley' decided by the United States Supreme
Court on July 25, 1974, the Court has apparently come full circle
in its consideration and decision of public school desegregation
cases begun twenty years ago with Brown v. Board of Education.2 If
Brown was, as it has properly been called, a watershed, Milliken may
well mark the water's edge. At least a slim majority of the
Court has signaled its unwillingness-with some limited exceptions-
to test the water beyond the shores of political-geographical subdivi-
sions of a state that mark the boundaries between the white suburbs
and black cities of the nation.3 In holding that as a general matter,
approval of so-called "metropolitan" school desegregation plans that in-
clude suburban school districts adjacent to or near by inner-city school
districts are beyond the remedial powers of federal district courts ex-
cept in restricted circumstances, the Court may well have been acting
on its perception circa 1974, of the tolerable limits of judicial intermed-
dling with life patterns evolved during the past few decades which serve
for the most part to insulate white suburban communities from the
* Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School, Newark, New Jersey. This paper was
prepared for a conference sponsored by the United States Commission on Civil Rights
on November 9, 1974. It is reprinted here without substantial change except for addi-
tional footnotes.
1. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Statements from the dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall are vivid in their
description of the consequences of this phenomena for our public schools: "an ex-
panding core of virtually all-Negro schools immediately surrounded by a receding band
of all-white schools." 418 U.S. at 785; "a growing core of Negro schools surrounded
by a receding ring of white schools", 418 U.S. at 799. Compare language in the brief
filed on behalf of the black parents who initiated suit in the district court: "the walling-
off of blacks in a state-imposed core of overwhelmingly black schools separated from
a ring of overwhelmingly white schools. . . ." Brief for Respondents at 9, Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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country's black population and its social demands. That the Court's
position might be so read may have prompted Justice Stewart whose
"swing vote" was crucial in forming the five-man majority, in separately
explaining his views to reply to what he characterized as "some of the
extravagant language of the dissenting opinions . . .
On its face, the Court was acting on its view of what the Constitu-
tion requires (and what it does not). In past school desegregation
cases, the Court has stated forthrightly that the governing constitutional
principles announced in Brown cannot "yield simply because of dis-
agreement with them."5
Though preservation of what many consider as the appropriate so-
cial configuration6 of American society is certainly one result of Milli-
ken, the Court was acting in its role as the final arbiter in constitutional
decision making so the central question of the meaning of Milliken must
be addressed in these terms. Since it purports to be a legally support-
able exposition of constitutional doctrine, perspective on this latest (and
perhaps last) pronouncement of major significance from the Supreme
4. 418 U.S. at 753. One can speculate that Justice Stewart probably had in mind
this language from Justice Douglas' dissent: "When we rule against the metropolitan
area remedy we take a step that will likely put the problems of the blacks and our soci-
ety back to the period that antedated the 'separate but equal' regime of Plessy v. Fergu-
son .... ." 418 U.S. at 759. Or perhaps from Justice White's dissent: "The Court's
remedy, in the end is essentially arbitrary and will leave serious violations of the Con-
stitution substantially unremedied." 418 U.S. at 780. Or from Justice Marshall's dis-
sent: "Mhe Court's answer is to provide no remedy at all for the violation proved
in this case, thereby guaranteeing that Negro children in Detroit will receive the same
separate and inherently unequal education in the future as they have been unconstita-
tionally afforded in the past." 418 U.S. at 782. However "extravagant" these com-
ments in Justice Stewart's view, they surely reflect the quite understandable position that
the whole of the Court's decision (as in the case of Brown) may well be greater than
the sum of its parts in terms of both constitutional doctrine and the effect on the society.
5. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955); accord, Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
6. 'The decade of the sixties was one of increasing suburbanization of whites in
metropolitan areas and of increasing concentration of blacks within central cities-in
short, of increasing racial separation. Between 1960 and 1970 the white central city
population in metropolitan areas having a population of 500,000 or more declined by
1.9 million people, while the comparable black population increased by 2.8 million. The
suburban rings of these same metropolitan areas had a white population increase of 12.5
million and a black population increase of only 0.8 million. In terms of percentage
changes, the increase in the black share of the central city population was 2:4 times
as great as the increase in the black share of total metropolitan population in these areas.
Moreover, in 10 of the 34 metropolitan areas having a population of one million or
more, the percentage of black suburban residents stayed the same or declined between
1960 and 1970." U.S. CoMMIssIoN ON CIvm IL;GTrs, EQUAL OPPOTuNm IN SUBUR-
BIA 6 (July, 1974) (footnotes omitted).
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Court on this subject can only be achieved if assessed from that stand-
point.
To appreciate the significance of Milliken, one must go back far-
ther than Brown v. Board of Education (Brown ]).7  However, the
opinion of Chief Justice Burger writing for the Court in the case, af-
ter reviewing preliminarily some of the facts and the procedural pos-
ture of the case, begins as does practically all exposition of doctrine
in this area with Brown I (Part II of the opinion) and significantly,
quotes Brown's language to the effect that:
[I]n the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but
equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal."
He then states, "[t]his has been reaffirmed time and again as the mean-
ing of the Constitution and the controlling rule of law."9  Thus, pur-
porting to reaffirm this language from Brown I as "the meaning of
the Constitution and the controlling rule of law," he decides with the
Court's majority that the Constitution does not mean that school deseg-
regation measures can be made effective (absent some limited special
circumstances) beyond a school district's boundaries as set by a state;
"the controlling rule of law" permits separate educational facilities that
may well be unequal to exist side by side in a city and its surrounding
suburbs. Clearly then, the overriding legal question posed by Milliken
is whether what the Court has done (or not done) can be squared with
what it has said.
Ever since Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II),° courts con-
sidering the problem of school desegregation have addressed it in terms
of what remedial steps were necessary in -a given situation to comply
with the governing rule of law announced in Brown I. And in that
mold the Milliken decision was cast, so on the face of it the disagree-
ment between the majority and the dissenters goes only to the matter
of remedy. Justice Stewart in his concurrence makes this explicit:
In the present posture of the case, therefore, the Court does not
deal with questions of substantive constitutional law. The basic is-
sue now before the Court concerns, rather, the appropriate exercise
of federal equity jurisdiction.1
Ostensibly, the justices in the majority and the dissent seem to be talk-
ing about remedy (with the possible exception of Justice Marshall). 12
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 737.
9. Id.
10. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
11. 418 U.S. at 753.
12. "The rights at issue in this case are too fundamental to be abridged on grounds
MILLIKEN v. BRADLEYSpring 1975]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
But I have said that to understand Milliken one needs to go much far-
ther back than both Brown decisions. What clearly emerges from a
close reading of the case is that the quarrel between the Court's ma-
jority and minority, despite Justice Stewart, despite the uniform as-
sumption made since Brown II, is not over the question of remedy at
all but really exposes a fundamental difference in the view taken of
the nature of the constitutional right of the present day black descend-
ants of slaves who attend the nation's public schools. How one views
the necessary remedy depends-and it is graphically illustrated in this
case-on how one views the nature of the right said by Milliken to be
"the meaning of the Constitution and the controlling rule of law." It
is appropriate, then, before undertaking detailed examination of several
subquestions raised by the decision, chief among them the question of
whether the Court has jettisoned or adhered to the "practical flexibility"
standard of Brown ]V' to address what I conceive as the main area
of disagreement-a perception of the nature of the constitutional right
involved.
H. The Nature of the Right
Before the adoption of the reconstruction amendments14 it was,
of course, unthinkable to suggest that there were any rights that Ameri-
can blacks could insist upon under the Constitution. As is well known,
blacks were slaves, a species of property, and as such, were not a part
of "the people of the United States"'I5 who had any hand in framing
the Constitution or structuring government under it. As the Dred Scott
decision' with its devastatingly accurate reading of history makes clear,
blacks derived no benefit from the Constitution; since not considered
as part of "the people of the United States," they were not citizens and
therefore neither the national government, any of its citizens, nor any
of the state governments owed any duty to accord them any of the
rights and privileges normally associated with citizenship. Of immediate
as superficial as those relied on by the majority today. We deal here with the right
of all of our children, whatever their race, to an equal start in life and to an equal op-
portunity to reach their full potential as citizens." 418 U.S. at 783 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis added).
Compare similar language in his dissenting opinion in San Antonio School District
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 71 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting), and see text accompany-
ing notes 76-78 infra.
13. "Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shap-
ing its remedies." 349 U.S. at 300.
14. U.S. CONST. Amends. XIII (1865), XIV (1868), XV (1870).
15. See U.S. CONST. preamble.
16. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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importance to our consideration this meant that none of the states of
the union prior to the Reconstruction amendments could have been
required under the Constitution to afford black children access to what
limited provisions had been made for public education at that time.
Of course, before blacks could become citizens they first had to
cease being slaves. That was the principal work of the Thirteenth
Amendment which for some, was alone sufficient to change the status
of blacks and make them citizens in every regard with all attendant
rights and privileges." However, the matter became academic after
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, whose first section was quite
clearly designed, with its definition for the first time in the Constitution
of what United States citizenship meant, to include all those who had
been formerly slaves and their descendants. Without dispute, this has
been the consistent reading of the meaning of the opening words of
that amendment.1 8  Pausing here then, without considering any of the
additional language of the amendment, it is clear that to the extent that
blacks were now recognized as "citizens" under the Constitution that
recognition implied in an absolute sense, the right to be accorded the
17. The contemporary understanding of the effect of the Thirteenth Amendment
was expressed in United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (No. 16,151) (Cir. Ct. D.
Ky. 1866) decided within a year after the amendment's adoption. Rhodes involved the
prosecution of whites for the burglary of the home of a black brought in a United States
Court under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Act of April 9, 1966, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), enacted pursuant to section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment. The Rhodes court said:
"The act of congress confers citizenship.
"We cannot deny the assent of our judgment to the soundness of the proposition that
the emancipation of a native born slave by removing the disability of slavery made him
a citizen. If these views be correct, the provision in the act of congress conferring citi-
zenship was unnecessary, and is inoperative. Granting this to be so, it was well, if con-
gress had the power, to insert it, in order to prevent doubts and differences of opinion
which might otherwise have existed upon the subject." 27 F. Cas. 788-89. Of course
the propriety of congressional adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was conclusively
settled in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), which reinforced-more
than 100 years after its ratification-the "promise of freedom," (392 U.S. 433) i.e., citi-
zenship, made by the amendment. The position is surveyed in detail in Kinoy, The
Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RuTGERS L. REv. 387 (1967).
18. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Justice Goldberg, concurring in Bell v. Maryland, 378
U.S. 226 (1964), stated:
'The first sentence of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the spirit of which per-
vades all the Civil War Amendments, was obviously designed to overrule Dred Scott v.
Sandford and to ensure that the constitutional concept of citizenship with all attendant
rights and privileges would henceforth embrace Negroes." Id. at 300.
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full range of treatment normally given to such persons. Since one of the
inescapable facets of citizenship rights is the opportunity for access to
public services provided by government on whatever terms they are pro-
vided, then black people, surely, at least as a matter of constitutional
doctrine, were entitled to these advantages. 19
But beyond the grant of United States citizenship, the Fourteenth
Amendment also decreed that thereafter black people were to be con-
sidered citizens of the state in which they happened to reside.20 Sim-
ilarly then, to the extent that the states create and define for all its citi-
zens certain rights and privileges (and concomitantly cast upon them
certain necessary burdens) then surely blacks, now citizens of the
states, had to be included.21 Again, what this meant in practical terms,
as it relates to the problem exposed in Milliken, is that state systems
for educating children at public expense, to the extent that they existed
or were formed, were to be made available to blacks not as a matter
of gift but, because they were now citizens, as a matter of right.22
The Fourteenth Amendment went even further. The equal pro-
tection clause of the amendment forbids the states from denying "to
19. See generally Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Bell v. Maryland, 378
U.S. 226, 286 (1964), for much of the historical evidence. Adverting to that evidence,
he states his agreement with the conclusion reached by the solicitor general that "it is
an inescapable inference that Congress, in recommending the Fourteenth Amendment,
expected to remove the disabilities barring Negroes from the public conveyances and
places of public accommodation with which they were familiar, and thus to assure Ne-
groes an equal right to enjoy these aspects of the public life of the community." Id.
at 290.
Of course, the Court has many times acted to assure the equal right of blacks to
access to the community's public facilities. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson,
350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches). Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf
courses); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (restaurants); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296
(1966) (parks).
20. See note 18 supra.
21. "[l]t was assumed that under state law, when the Negro's disability as a citi-
zen was removed, he would be assured the same public civil rights that the law had guar-
anteed white persons." Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 301 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
22. This is the reading given to the Fourteenth Amendment by the Brown Court.
Though that Court recognized that largely because state public education systems were
in a seminal stage at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, contempo-
rary history regarding the application of the amendment to the specific subject of public
education was at best "inconclusive," 347 U.S. at 489, it also recognized that "the first
cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment. . .interpreted it as proscrib-
ing all state imposed discriminations against the Negro race." 347 U.S. at 490 (empha-
sis added). "Mhe opportunity of an education", the Court continued, "where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms." 347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
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any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. '23
As that clause was consistently interpreted by the Supreme Court in
the period from the adoption of the amendment to Plessy v. Ferguson,24
its purpose went beyond the grant of citizenship-which ought to have
been enough-to a requirement that states must in all areas of their
interaction qua states with their citizens, treat black citizens the same
as white citizens.2 5  Of significance to an understanding of the debate
in Milliken, is the observation that the equal protection clause speaks
to the states, not to their subdivisions, whether county, parish, city, town
or village.26
If then the nature of the constitutional right of black citizens is
not to be treated unequally with respect to whatever public benefits a
given state bestows on all its citizens, application of this principle to
public schools operated by the states is clear: black students should
have the same opportunity as white students (and all others) to receive
whatever benefits may be thought to flow from an educational system
conducted at the state's expense and managed by persons employed by
or operating under state authority.27 Put another way, the nature of
the constitutional right goes beyond-and this implicates the question
of remedy-the mere permission of -attendance at schools but requires
state effort to assure "equal protection of the laws." Surely, whatever
23. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
24. 103 U.S. 537 (1896).
25. See The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wail) 36 (1873); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Neal v.
Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
26. Continued emphasis of this point occurs in the dissent filed by Justice White
in Milliken: "Mhe State of Michigan is the entity at which the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is directed ..... " 418 U.S. at 763; "[]t is the State that must respond to the
command of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 770; "No 'State' may deny any indi-
vidual the equal protection of the laws. . . ." Id. at 771; "The obligation to rectify the
unlawful condition nevertheless rests on the State." Id. at 773.
The repetition of course reflects the tenacious "state action" dogma given birth in
the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883'). "[Siome State action through its officers
or agents . . . ." 109 U.S. at 13, is required for application of the equal protection
clause, but the nationwide circumstance of public school systems operated under state
authority by state officers clearly pretermits-whatever the continued vitality of the doc-
trine-any question whether the requirement is met in school desegregation cases.
27. The principle of course applies no matter the kind of public educational facility
involved. See, e.g., Singleton v. Board of Commissioners of State Institutions, 356 F.2d
771 (5th Cir. 1966) (reform school); Crum v. State Training School for Girls, 413 F.2d
1348 (5th Cir. 1969) (same); Montgomery v. Oakley Training School, 426 F.2d 296
(5th Cir. 1970) (same). And of course, prior to Brown, the equal protection clause
had been applied to higher education. E.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950);
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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benefits are derived from the state's system of laws as it relates to pub-
lic education must be made available to all upon whom the state can
exert its power and from whom it can require obedience. In this view,
to use the phrase from Swann28 that constantly recurs throughout the
opinions, "the condition that offends the Constitution '21 is any condition
for which the state is responsible that prevents according black public
school children throughout the state, who are its citizens, whatever posi-
tive educational advantages -the state is in a position to 'bestow. The
entire range of matters normally thought derivable from access to public
education would seem to be included. 30
Thus a basic difference between those in the majority and those
in the dissent in Milliken is the perception of the constitutional right
and from that naturally enough, a differing appreciation of when the
right is violated and what is needed to remedy such violation. This
is quite clear from the chief justice's statement in the majority opinion
that, "[t]he constitutional right of the Negro respondents residing in
Detroit is to attend a unitary school system in that district"31 even
though the Fourteenth Amendment refers simply to the state. The
question quite naturally arises whether this judgment as to the nature
of the right involved is consistent with what the chief justice earlier des-
cribes, quoting from Brown I ("Separate educational facilities are in-
herently unequal"), as "the meaning of the Constitution and the con-
trolling rule of law."32 It is difficult to know how the Court's majority
can purport to adhere to this statement from Brown if the nature of
the right is only as described by the chief justice. If the nature of the
right is only to prevent racially biased school assignments in the city
of Detroit then it would appear to be a refutation of the historical con-
cerns, highlighted above, from which the constitutional amendment
flowed. Naturally enough, however, if that is the nature of the right,
then a more restricted view of -the inquiry necessary to determine when
28. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
29. 402 U.S. at 16.
30. "Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great exrenditures for educa-
tion both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it
is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values in preparing him for
later professional training and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity of an education." Brown v. Board of Education (Brown
I), 347 U.S. at 493.
31. 418 U.S. at 746.
32. 418 U.S. at 737.
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the right has been violated and to conclude what remedy is needed is
justified. Given the history, the questions of what is the right and what
is the remedy for its violation are inextricably interwoven.3 3 Certainly,
where one comes out on the question of an interdistrict remedy affords
a complete statement of one's view of what black children are entitled
to under the Constitution.
H. The Course of Remedy
Indeed, what the Court has done in the cases since Brown I and
prior to Milliken has been constantly to define and redefine the nature
of -the constitutional right of black children -to public education during
the course of the now imposing number of presumptively remedial de-
cisions in which varying factual patterns called forth a definition. This
exercise was undertaken, to be sure, to decide concrete cases and to
resolve the conflicting claims of parties-black children and their par-
ents on the one hand as to their rights, and school authorities on the
other as to their immunities-under Brown, but it also was undertaken
against the backdrop of increasing national concern over what if any-
limits the Court would eventually impose on the Brown doctrine.
Brown I, of course, was a precise application of the Fourteenth
Amendment, clearly mandated in the context of the cases under con-
sideration.3 4  The Court's description in Milliken of the meaning of
Brown is consistent with what 'has been described as the nature of the
constitutional right. But Brown was limited by its facts: it needed to
go no further to reach its result, dealing as it was with school systems
that historically had maintained schools unmistakenly violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment; "the condition that offends the Constitution"
was clear in those cases.
33. Justice Marshall's dissent reveals the essential relatedness of the right-remedy
question: "Mhe Court, confuses the inquiry required to determine whether there has
been a substantive constitutional violation with that necessary to formulate an appropri-
ate remedy once a constitutional violation has been shown. While a finding of state
action is of course a prerequisite to finding a violation, we have never held that after
unconstitutional state action has been shown, the District Court at the remedial stage
must engage in a second inquiry to determine whether additional state action exists to
justify a particular remedy." 418 U.S. at 799 n.19. Of course, the comment also throws
in bold relief the nature of the disagreement between the Court and the dissenters.
34. See Amaker, Public School Desegregation: Legal Perspectives, 7 GA. S.BJ.
102 (1970); 33 NEGRO HisTORy BuLL. 174 (1970): "What the Court did in 1954 is
what courts and lawyers have traditionally done in fashioning legal rules out of the ma-
terials of language, history, social conditions, logic and precedent for application to exist-
ing social phenomena."
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It was then a relatively simple step beginning with Brown 113
to launch the case-by-case development seen in the past two decades:
federal district court consideration to determine initially whether a case
was "like" the Brown I cases, whether there was so-called de lure seg-
regation; 6 if so, a factfinding process at that level to determine how
to remedy the situation; where significant questions were raised in the
litigation, appeal to the courts of appeals and finally to the Supreme
Court. The Court, in passing on the question of remedy raised in the
case, revealed increasingly more about the nature of the constitutional
right involved. For example, the Court declared that black children
initially assigned to school on a racial basis could not be required to
transfer from a school where their race was in a minority to a school
where their race constituted the majority; 7 that black children had a
right to attend nonracially segregated schools without having to resort
to state administrative remedies; 8 that there was a right to have the
public schools kept open in a given county so that desegregation could
go forward if a state kept public schools open elsewhere;3 9 that there
was a constitutional right to a racially desegregated public school facul-
ty;40 that there was a right to have that plan of desegregation adopted
that would affirmatively undo the effects of prior discrimination;4 ' that
desegregation pursuant to such a plan must occur as soon as possible; 42
and that such a plan might include the use of school buses within reason-
able limits of time and distance.43  Prior to Milliken, the Court had
told us that these are all within the intent of Brown I and constitute the
"meaning of the Constitution."
The issues that brought Milliken v. Bradley, a case "like" the
Brown I cases, 44 to the Court from this process of case-by-case defini-
35. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
36. Cases found not to be "like" Brown, i.e., so-called de facto cases, have not
prompted plenary consideration by the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Bell v. School City, 324
F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. den., 377 U.S. 924 (1964); Downs v. Board of Educa-
tion, 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. den. 380 U.S. 914 (1965); Deal v. Cincinnati
Board of Education, 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. den., 389 U.S. 847 (1967). Of
course, whether a case is de jure or de facto is itself a matter of characterization,
ultimately a matter of defining the scope of the equal protection clause as it bears on
the right of Negro school children to public education. Keyes v. School District No.
1,413 U.S. 189 (1973).
37. Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
38. McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
39. Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
40. Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198 (1965).
41. Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
42. Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
43. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
44. See note 36 supra.
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tion of the nature of the constitutional right were fairly predictable.
Eventually, the social movement of the nation in the post-Brown de-
cades ( much of it no doubt caused by Brown) would pose for the Court
yet another choice of competing interests. Theoretically, the choice of
a so-called metropolitan plan of school desegregation was a logical next
step based on the historical analysis outlined above.
The argument, ably made by the dissenters in Milliken,45 is
straightforward enough: since the Fourteenth Amendment speaks to
the states, not to its subdivisions; since the Constitution recognizes the
equal protection right of blacks but does not similarly recognize a state's
right to maintain political-geographical subdivisions; since these sub-
divisions are at most no more than a convenient administrative appa-
ratus; and since in other contexts, specifically the reapportionment
cases, the Court has required restructuring of a state's political subdivi-
sions for equal protection purposes;46 it follows that school district boun-
daries may give way also if that is required to prevent state denial of
equal educational opportunity to black children.
Notwithstanding the strength of the argument, a majority of the
Court declined to accept it. Thus, we are left with the majority's view
of the limits of Brown as "the meaning of the Constitution."
IV. The Court's Opinion
The majority's restrictive view of the constitutional question at is-
sue is reflected throughout the Court's opinion. Note for instance how
the chief justice poses the question presented at the opening of the
opinion:
We granted certiorari in these consolidated cases to determine
whether a federal court may impose a multi-district, areawide rem-
edy to a single-district de jure segregation problem absent any find-
ing that the other included school districts have failed to operate
unitary school systems within their districts, absent any claim or
finding that the boundary lines of any affected school district were
established with the purpose of fostering racial segregation in pub-
lic schools, absent any finding that the included districts committed
acts which effected segregation within the other districts, and ab-
sent a meaningful, opportunity for the included neighboring school
districts to present evidence or be heard on the propriety of a multi-
district remedy or on the question of constitutional violations by
those neighboring districts. 47
45. See 418 U.S. at 762 (White, J., dissenting).
46. 418 U.S. at 777-78 (White, J., dissenting) 418 U.S. at 807-08 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
47. 418 U.S. at 721-22. One can't help but be impressed with the chief justice's
advocacy skills. As every lawyer knows, how one frames the question(s) to be decided
Spring 19751
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
This statement of the question for decision nowhere mentions the
state of Michigan, 48 but rather emphasizes a concern with the integrity
of school district lines when called into question in federal courts.
(The alternative wording of the question, framed by the counsel for
the black parents, emphasizes the issue of the state's action.) The initial
inquiry for Chief Justice Burger then is not with Michigan's responsi-
bility as a state for alleged denial of equal protection to the plaintiffs
and their class, but rather with the culpability (or lack of it) of the out-
lying school districts. The problem is described not in terms of state
responsibility but rather as "a single district de jure segregation prob-
lem," thus confining the inquiry to whether the other districts have done
anything to account for the problem in Detroit; if the state is to be held
accountable in any way, it can only be if the boundary lines of any
affected school district were established with the purpose of fostering
racial segregation irrespective of whatever else the state has done or
failed to do. Such a contained view of where the inquiry ought to begin
and end is understandable only in terms of a similarly telescoped view
of what the Constitution permits the plaintiffs to litigate, whether racially
discriminatory conduct affects their attendance in the Detroit school
system instead of whether the state of Michigan is affording them as
citizens, the same kind of educational opportunity it makes available
to white citizen-school children.42
Similarly expressive of the Court's restricted view of the nature
of the constitutional right is the emphasis in the majority opinion on
the district court's apparent failure to respect what is seen as the due
is critical to the ultimate decision. The alternative question framed by counsel for the
black plaintiff-respondents before the Supreme Court is: "May the State of Michigan
continue the intentional confinement of black children to an expanding core of state-
imposed black schools within a line, in a way no less effective than intentionally drawing
a line around them, merely because petitioners seek to interpose an existing school dis-
trict boundary as the latest line of containment?" Brief for Respondents, at 1-2 Milli-
ken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
It is of course, a tremendous aid to advocacy when the advocate is a justice (let
alone chief justice) of the nation's highest court.
48. See note 47 supra.
49. A similar divergence of views occurred during the previous term with respect
to a state's-as opposed to an individual district's-responsibility for financing public
education. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973). Justice Douglas, who also dissented in Rodriguez, makes essentially the same
point in his dissent here as in that case, i.e., that the cases taken together mean that
the Court, by not requiring the states as a part of their constitutional duty under the
equal protection clause to do whatever they can to assure that public educational benefits
are in fact made available to all children throughout the state on terms as nearly equal
as human ingenuity can make them, has itself defaulted in its duty under the Constitu-
tion. See text accompanying notes 76-78 infra.
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process rights of the suburban school districts-notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard on the question of the feasibility of a metropolitan
plan. The opinion mentions, for example, the fact that the district
court deferred a ruling on a motion by parents of Detroit school chil-
dren who had intervened as defendants, to join as additional defendants
school districts in the surrounding counties until after it had ordered
the defendant state officials (including in addition to the governor and
attorney general, the State Board of Education and its superintendent):
["]o submit desegregation plans encompassing the three-county
metropolitan area despite the fact that the 85 outlying school dis-
tricts of these three counties were not parties. and despite the
fact that there had been no claim that these outlying districts had
committed constitutional violations.5"
Described as "significant factors" were: that the district court eventu-
ally permitted intervention by the suburban districts on the second day
of the hearings scheduled on the desegregation plans submitted by the
Detroit school officials and the state officials (notice of the hearing hav-
ing been given only a week before), but the intervenors' roles were lim-
ited to that of filing a brief within one week thereafter on the legal
propriety of the metroplan, and counsel for the intervenors was limited
in oral argument to how the plan would operate rather than whether
it was appropriate." Perhaps weightiest of all in this aspect of the
Court's consideration, was the district court's admission that it had not
taken proof "with respect to the establishment of the boundaries of the
86 public school districts . . . nor on the issue of whether . . . such
school districts have committed acts of de jure segregation. 52
No one, of course, contends that the districts surrounding Detroit
whose educational facilities and personnel and whose parents and chil-
dren were ultimately to be involved in a metropolitan plan should not
have had some opportunity to become involved in the details of how
such a plan would be implemented. But -the question of whether such
plan should be implemented was ultimately for the Court -to decide with
the overarching consideration being the constitutional commands. The
50. 418 U.S. at 729-30. The Court however, also notes, that the plaintiff parents
opposed intervention by other school districts because they felt "the presence of the state
defendants was sufficient ... ." 418 U.S. at 729 n.9. The plaintiffs' view of the na-
ture of the right, of its violation and of where responsibility lay for correcting such viola-
tion obviously differed from that of Court's majority.
51. Id. at 731.
52. 418 U.S. at 730 n.11. The Court at a later point mentions that the panel ap-
pointed by the district court to prepare a plan for the metropolitan area included only
one member representing the intervening suburban districts. 418 U.S. at 733 n.14. This
too, apparently, was not viewed favorably by the Court's majority.
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legal process would be divorced from reality if the Supreme Court did
not consider how the district court performed its function in arriving
at its decision; but in the delicate process of drawing the line between
apparent due process deprivations of the rights of school districts and
the obvious deprivations of the rights of the plaintiffs under the equal
protection clause, the line was apparently drawn by the Court in this
case to embrace concerns which in the context of the litigation were
of relatively less moment.
Similarly, the Court in disagreeing with the court of appeals' af-
firmance of the district court's requirement of a metropolitan plan,
commented on the court of appeals' failure to discuss in its opinion
claims that the outlying suburban districts had not themselves commit-
ted any constitutional violation and "that no evidence on that point had
been allowed . . . ., The Court seemed particularly troubled that
the court of appeals, in remanding the case -to the district court, did
not require that court to receive evidence "on the question of whether
the affected districts had committed any violation of the constitutional
rights of Detroit pupils or others."54 Here again, such concerns are sig-
nificant only because of the view taken by the court of the nature of
the basic constitutional right.
After having taken the lower courts to task, the Court opened Part
i1 of its opinion with the quote from Brown I that "separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal." Then considering Swann's admoni-
tion that courts are to correct "the condition that offends the Constitu-
tion," the Court relates both standards to the same frame of reference
that was adumbrated by its opening statement of the question pre-
sented. The frame of reference is the city of Detroit: emphasis in
the quote from Brown is laid on "separate' and thus "the condition that
offends the Constitution" is the separateness of black children within
Detroit rather than their lack of equality vis-a-vis other school children
in Michigan. From this stance, the Court moved to criticism of the dis-
trict court for having "abruptly rejected" the Detroit only school de-
segregation plan,5" and its further comments underline what clearly
emerged as a major stumbling block for the Court's majority, the catch-
phrase "racial balance." The lower courts are accused of endorsing a
metroplan because a Detroit only plan "would not produce the racial
balance which they perceived as desirable."56 Of course, the Court
53. 418 U.S. at 736.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 738.
56. Id. at 740.
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at this point has moved as far away from the central point respecting the
constitutional rights of black children as it accused the lower courts of
doing in requiring a metroplan.17
Finally, the Court shifts the focus entirely away from the constitu-
tional right of black school children and a remedy for its violation to
a concern with local autonomy in the management of school systems
within a state. This focus on school autonomy leads the Court to spec-
ulate on the possible consequences of implementation of any metro-
politan school remedy.58 The Court seems horrified at the notion that
the tradition of local control of schools in its present form might be al-
tered thus choosing this value rather than the constitutionally mandated
requirement of actual equality of educational opportunity. This em-
phasis on local autonomy irresistibly leads to its clearest statement that,
"[t]he constitutional right of the Negro respondents residing in Detroit
is to attend a unitary school system in that district."5 9 Thus, the consti-
tutional right is the right of attendance in a given district no matter what
deficiencies of educational opportunity may exist; anything else is a
"drastic expansion of the constitutional right itself. . .."60
Justice Stewart in his concurrence shows a similar refractory ap-
proach to the problem. One might agree in the abstract that "the mere
fact of different racial compositions in contiguous districts does not it-
self imply or constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
.. . .MI But the problem is hardly abstract. His conclusion that the
Court is not dealing with substantive constitutional law questions is as
I have previously indicated, simply not right. In seeking to confine the
scope of the majority opinion to the matter of remedy, he of course
joined the view that prevailed as to the nature of the constitutional
right. Nevertheless, he focuses on what factual showing is needed in
a given case to validate the remedy thought appropriate by the district
court. In sum, there must be some kind of factual showing involving
57. Desdemona thought Othello's accounts of his travels and battles "strange, won-
drous strange." I have a similar reaction to the Court's use of "racial balance" as a
means of avoiding the fundamental issue. The Fourteenth Amendment does not cast
the issue in terms of "racial balance," "race mixing" or any of the other flaccid substi-
tutes for analysis of the real problem so rife in our contemporary jargon. The "racial
balance" phrase at best (or worst) is a piece of political patchwork introduced into the
vocabulary of school cases to blunt the effectiveness of efforts to resolve the basic ques-
tion of how educational benefits are to be made real for millions of black children to
whom they've been denied because of the legacy of slavery.
58. 418 U.S. at 743.
59. Id. at 746.
60. Id. at 747.
61. Id. at 756.
Spring 19751 MILLIKEN v. BRADLEY
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
a relationship between where children go to school and the use of state
power to that end. Hence, it is dispositive for him that evidence of
the drawing or redrawing of school district lines, or the transfer of
school units by districts, or -the discriminatory use of housing and zon-
ing laws by the state, is absent. Because of this absence he finds the
interdistrict remedy "simply not responsive to the factual record ... "'
But what leads him to this conclusion, though he takes care to
frame his opinion in remedial guise and specifically disallows its impact
on "questions of substantive constitutional law," is precisely a reading
of the Constitution and a rendering of Brown I that obviates for him
the necessity of looking at the impact of what the State has failed to
do to assure maximum access to educational benefits it bestows rather
than whether the state may be said to be "innocent" of the kind of con-
duct that for him might prompt a different conclusion. Clearly, a more
searching light thrown on the seeming historical purpose of the equal
protection clause might alter his notion of the remedial excesses of the
district court.
V. The Impact of the Decision
With Milliken, we have now been afforded what many have
sought from the Supreme Court in the years since Brown I: a definitive
answer to the questions of what that decision means and what it re-
quires of state authorities, local school officials, -the lower federal courts
and finally the lawyers who by taking school desegregation cases to
court on behalf of Negro parents and their children have sought to give
living reality to the break with the past that Brown represented. Mil-
liken in quoting Brown I's exhortation that "separate educational facili-
ties are inherently unequal"63 and equating it with "the meaning of the
Constitution" 4 has determined the scope of constitutional doctrine and
described for us the practical limits of Brown I, thus stilling, at least
for the moment, the debate that has occurred during the last two dec-
ades of what the quoted language means.
As to the scope of constitutional doctrine: the "meaning of the
Constitution" despite its grant of citizenship to blacks and proscription
of state denial of equal protection of the laws, is that state authorities
have no affirmative duty to expend any effort toward guaranteeing that
the yield from its educational harvest is actually shared with its black
citizens as well as with its white. Their duty at most is to remain in-
62. Id.
63. Id. at 737.
64. Id.
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nocent of any conduct that may be seen as causing racial separation
within a district. As to the practical limits of Brown I: there is no lit-
eral quality to the quoted text; separate educational facilities no matter
how "inherently unequal" may coexist within a state if the mode of their
coexistence is a set of lines labeled a "school system" or "school district"
even though one or more of the lines touches immediately a similarly
labeled school system or district in which the fruits of education are
richer -and more nourishing. Thus the doctrine of "separate but equal"
continues to have a place in the field of public education so long as
the separateness is the result of boundaries around school districts
drawn with no purpose of racial containment irrespective of whether
actual equality of educational opportunity results. Local school au-
thorities to be sure must continue to do what they can -to prevent public
schools in their charge from being racially identifiable with respect to
students, teachers, administrators and staff. They must still justify ob-
vious inequalities regarding sharing of facilities and expenditure of
monies at their disposal. They must be careful about where schools
are built and how their school transportation systems operate. They
will not, however, be held responsible if in the end, racial identi-
fiability does result and the children attending their schools are not
being educated as well as the children who go to school in the neighbor-
ing district; their "local autonomy" will assure that they will not be cal-
led to account. Given the Court's definitive interpretation in Milliken
of Brown I, the fears of school authorities at state and local levels that
Brown may indeed have meant they would be required to pay strict
attention to how effectively their educational system was educating
black children are quieted and the de jure-de facto distinction has been
re-emphasized.6 5
In terms of what Milliken means for the lower courts, there is
clearly a jettisoning of the "practical flexibility" standard of Brown II.
This standard, as reinterpreted in Swann6 does not permit district
courts to require or approve plans for school desegregation that involve
school districts other than the one in suit except in what will be rela-
tively rare instances in which parties successfully undertake a major
burden of proof not heretofore thought necessary. The instances men-
tioned in a general way in the opinion-in-chief are "where the racially
discriminatory acts of one or more school districts cause[d] racial segre-
gation in an adjacent district, or where district lines have been deliber-
65. 'The record before us... contains evidence of de jure segregated conditions
only in the Detroit schools ... ." Id. at 745.
66. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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ately drawn on the basis of race.' '67  The former presumably might in-
clude cases where it could 'be shown that school officials in one district
had located a school or a number of them in such a way-either by
construction or change of attendance areas-to encourage white flight
from a district to a neighboring district.68  The latter might involve a
showing of territorial annexations or detachments and/or the shifting
of boundary lines such as occurred in one case. 69 Not only will the
occasions be rare when such a showing can be made, but in order to
make such a showing even on these rare occasions, it seems clear that
one would have to prove purposeful conduct which given the sophisti-
cation of the deceptive art in race cases, is increasingly harder to do.
Beyond this, the rarity of the instances makes this particular game
not worth the candle; the vast majority of intrastate school district ar-
rangements will be seen under the Milliken standard as innocently ar-
rived at. 70  Once school officials show-as they can in practically all
cases-that the boundaries of their district were not drawn (at least
not so recently as to be noticed) deliberately with racial segregation
in mind, that will be the end of the matter and the hand of the courts
will be stayed.
Much has been made of Justice Stewar's rendering of the majority
holding with his emphasis on what factual showing would be necessary
to sustain a cross-district decree as a possibility for lessening the impact
of the majority decision. However, upon analysis his statement of what
the Court's opinion means is substantially the same as that of the
opinion of the Court. With one exception, a district court case invol-
ving a legislative effort in North Carolina to carve out of an existing
county two racially separate school districts, 71 he cites the same cases
67. 418 U.S. at 745.
68. But note that Justice Marshall's criticism of the state of Michigan's ultimate
responsibility for the "white flight" phenomenon went unheeded. Apparently, the ma-
jority believes that the individual district must be shown responsible.
69. United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Texas 1970), af 'd, 447 F.2d
441 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Edgar v. United States, 404 U.S. 1016
(1972). Both the chief justice and Justice Stewart cite this case as an example of a
situation in which an interdistrict remedy might be appropriate. 418 U.S. at 744, 418
U.S. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring).
70. Note for instance, that according to Chief Justice Burger, the constitutional vi-
olation within one district, whether that of the local district or of the state, must produce
"a significant segregative effect in another district." 418 U.S. at 745. But he failed
to construe as did the dissenters, what the record showed the state had done here as
sufficiently "significant" to warrant an inter-district remedy. So much for the problem
of proof.
71. Turner v. Warren County Board of Education, 313 F. Supp. 380 (E.D.N.C.
1970).
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as Chief Justice Burger cited earlier.72 None of these cases is particu-
larly helpful in blunting the essential thrust of the Milliken holding.
All involved some demonstrable effort by local school authorities or
state officials to arrange or rearrange school district boundaries to main-
tain segregation and in all -the purposefulness of what was attempted
could be readily seen. Thus the compelling nature of the proof burden
as I have described it (totally dispositive for Justice Stewart) seems the
same whether one reads the main opinion or the concurrence. This
is so even if one seizes upon Justice Stewart's advertence to the use
of state housing or zoning laws by state authorities to maintain segre-
gation as one means of demonstrating the need for a metropolitan rem-
edy.7 3  There is no question at least since Buchanan v. Warley7" that
use of such laws by state or local school authorities to maintain racial
segregation (as for example, by placing schools to serve -black and
white residential communities pursuant to such laws) is proscribed but
there is still, under Justice Stewart's formulation, -the twin necessity for
showing that their use by a district is "purposeful," not adventitious,
and moreover that the communities created across the school district
boundaries are a direct result of such use.
In sum, notwithstanding Justice Stewart's interpolation, litigants
who argue the necessity of a metropolitan plan in school cases must
be prepared to carry the burden of proving purposeful discrimination
with respect to the creation of school district boundaries; they will no
longer be permitted-in the absence of a suit against the state as a
whole in which all of a state's districts are named as defendants or more
modestly, suits against several but fewer than all districts within a
state7 5-to rest solely on a showing of racial isolation within a district
and inequality with respect to a neighboring district. That avenue is
closed.
Perhaps the greatest impact of the decision beyond these nice,
lawyers' questions relating to proof burdens, is what it augurs for the
72. 418 U.S. at 744.
73. 418 U.S. at 755. But see the recent decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals on rehearing in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930 (7th
Cir. 1974), rendered after the decision in Milliken, endorsing the principle of metropoli-
tan relief to remedy housing discrimination in Chicago on the ground that discrimination
in Chicago may have affected housing patterns throughout the Chicago metropolitan re-
gion. How the Supreme Court might respond if the metropolitan remedy problem were
presented in a housing rather than a school context is a matter of speculation, but given
the decision in Milliken, this avenue will inevitably be examined in the future.
74. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
75. The enormity of the proof burden under these circumstances is evident.
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future with respect to efforts to fulfill the historic purpose of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In that light, Justice Douglas' reference to the
Court's recent 5-4 decision on state government responsibility for school
financing76 takes on added significance:
Today's decision given Rodriguez means that there is no violation
of the Equal Protection Clause though the schools are segregated
by race and though the Black schools are not only "separate" but
inferior.77
Focusing on the equal protection aspect of the Fourteenth
Amendment as it applies to public education, Justice Douglas con-
cludes, considering the observable social facts described in his dissent,78
that given both Rodriguez and Milliken the Court has ignored state re-
sponsibility for doing all it can to guarantee all its citizens (including
those who are black and poor-and in Detroit, as elsewhere, they
amount to the same people) that educational opportunity will be the
same throughout the state. In his view, a view supported by the historic
framework in which the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the deci-
sions taken together signal an abandonment of the amendment's central
purpose and focus inadequately on the question, on the one hand, of
whether schools in a given district of the state are racially segregated,
and on the other, whether the amount of expenditures for education
made by the state are minimally nondiscriminatory from district to dis-
trict; but the continued racial separateness of schools which are also
poorer is condoned! His comment accurately takes into account the
prevalence of the same approximate set of social conditions that it was
the work of the Fourteenth Amendment to change; he has essentially said
to the Court's majority and to us that it simply will not do to say to the
states to whom the Fourteenth Amendment speaks directly, that you may
continue to do nothing about the underlying social facts of racially sep-
arate and inferior public education. The issues for him then, are not as
they apparently were for the majority of the Court-whether the Four-
teenth Amendment's equal protection clause requires racial balance or
whether local autonomy is sacrificed-but rather whether given the ex-
isting social conditions, the state as a whole must do everything in its
power to change them since only in this way will equal protection of
the laws not be denied.
76. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
77. 418 U.S. at 761.
78. 418 U.S. at 76 n.10 (The Detroit inner city is almost solidly black; blacks at-
tending school there "are likely to be poorer"; the black schools in Detroit are inferior
to those in neighboring districts.)
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VI. Conclusion
A final set of observations. Of course, it understates the truth by
a great deal to say that questions relating to public school desegregation
are "often strongly entangled in popular feeling. '79 One need only re-
flect on the history of these past years from Clinton, Tennessee to Bos-
ton to confirm this. Thus quite aside from the importance and rele-
vancy of constitutional analysis attempted here, ultimately the Court's
decision in Milliken will be judged--despite any protestations to the
contrary-on the basis of the majority's considered choice of what in
these times appeared to it the greater evil: a judgment upholding with
some restrictions, the power of communities to deal with their educa-
tional systems locally, or a judgment that more nearly reflects what the
Fourteenth Amendment would seem to be all about. In successive
terms now, the Court has opted for the former in the face of historically
supportable competing claims as to what the Fourteenth Amendment
requires for the states qua states. Its judgment no doubt has inescap-
ably been formed with knowledge of the pressures generated not only
from those who would deny black rights altogether, but also from those
of whom it can be fairly said that -their primary interest is in having
as much to do as possible with where and how their children are edu-
cated. Thus the question of busing for example is important not be-
cause of the Fourteenth Amendment but because existing social ar-
rangements including the fact of residential segregation and city-subur-
ban separations0 makes it so. And it would be naive to think that the
Court does not recognize this.8" Hence Milliken can be seen as a re-
sponse to the play of forces that underlies the continuing debate sur-
rounding complex questions of race, poverty, and education.
Having said this much and given the need to know the nature of
things in which our feelings are involved, one ought candidly to recog-
nize that the goal-important to some-of mixing the races in the pub-
lic schools for its own sake or because as Justice Marshall says, in
dissent, this may the only way "that our people will ever learn to live
together"' 82 is not central to the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.83 There is no hard evidence that this is or ever was a condition
79. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
80. See note 6 supra.
81. Indeed, Justice Marshall in dissent states his belief that the decision is "a re-
flection of a perceived public mood." 418 U.S. at 814.
82. 418 U.S. at 783.
83. We would do well to have a clearer perception of our premises regarding con-
stitutional analysis than has often been evidenced. One commentator, for example, has
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precedent for learning to live together. But what there is hard evi-
dence of -and that evidence still exists-is that "separate but equal"
has not achieved in American society the goals that the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to accomplish, full accordance to blacks of
the rights of citizenship on equal terms. Given our history and our ex-
perience as a nation, we know that those who ultimately control bene-
fits at the state level are members of the white majority who to date
have not shown, without compulsion, any desire to bestow these bene-
fits on children of the black minority to the same degree as they do
on their own children. Thus, Brown v. Board of Education was a nec-
essary way to begin the achievement of true educational equality for
the simple reason that those who control educational policy and educa-
tional finance presumably would be compelled thereby to provide the
same education to blacks as to whites. This remains true today and
so the point of Brown is still valid and will be for generations to come
given the extent of the pre-existing historical conditions.
But if Brown is limited-as apparently it is by Milliken-to a con-
stitutional right only of attendance on more or less nondiscriminatory
terms within a school district, then what remains of the rest of the
Fourteenth Amendment given the compelling nature of tho fact of
largely affluent white suburban communities surrounding largely poor
black cities? Surely, the controllers of state policy and finance
who have historically paid little or no attention to the educational
needs of their black citizen-school children will continue to do so. So
it is not a question at all of whether schools are "majority black" or
"racially balanced"--hat colloquy misses the point of equal protection
of the laws. The prime reason for desegregation of public schools is
to assure, in light of our history and experience, that conduct by officials
not be racially discriminatory insofar as the permissible exertions of
state power or the valid objectives of state conduct are concerned.
Thus, where education is the function involved, the equal protection
read Brown as a decision which enforces a right of association between blacks and
whites: "For me, assuming equal facilities, the question posed by state-enforced segre-
gation is not one of discrimination at all. Its human and its constitutional dimensions
lie entirely elsewhere, in the denial by the state of freedom to associate, a denial that
impinges in the same way on any groups or races that may be involved." Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 H-Iv. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959) (em-
phasis added). Emphasis as a constitutional matter on the question of "association,"
equally a cornerstone of liberal faith and the bte noir of racist fears, is responsible for
the skewered perception of Brown and its progeny that has infused debate over "integra-
tion" vs. "segregation" rather than education which "assuming equal fadilities"---("Aye,
there's the rub")-can of course occur in schools which are totally black or in which
blacks are a substantial majority.
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clause says that the states must assure as an affirmative matter, that
benefits and burdens are equally shared and imposed to the extent that
human ingenuity can assure that result.
This is the failure of Milliken. Of course, practical limits must
always be observed with respect to the realization of any constitutional
right.s4 It would, for example, be extreme to suggest that any parent,
black or white, whose children live in New York City send them to
school in Buffalo, or that children living in St. Louis must attend school
in Kansas City, or those living in Tallahassee must attend school in
Miami. But such extreme results were neither sought nor intended in
Detroit. Rather, plaintiffs there were asking only that the court require
the state of Michigan to do what it could in fact do with relatively little
expenditure of human capacity. It would seem that given the nature
of the constitutional right this was not asking too much and the real
tragedy of Milliken consists in the Court's view that these parents under
our Constitution, had no right to ask at least this much.
84. Everyone knows one can't falsely shout "fire!" in a crowded theater. Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.).
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